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1ABSTRACT
Credit constraints and a need to invest in host country-speciﬁc human capital may lead
immigrant couples to adopt a family investment strategy. Researchers attempting to evaluate
this family investment hypothesis, however, face severe data limitations, because standard data
sources often identify the foreign born, but typically provide no information about the migrat-
ing unit or the immigration process itself. Principal applicants are usually indistinguishable
from accompanying family members and while family units at the time of data collection are
identiﬁed, family units at the time of migration are completely unknown.
This paper re-examines the family investment hypothesis by utilizing new panel data for a
recent cohort of immigrant households. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia
provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously consider the labor-supply and human capital
investment decisions of men and women in the same migrating household. In particular we
are interested in how selection criteria are related to the settlement process and whether these
patterns support the family investment hypothesis.
The determinants of participation, unemployment, hours, and human capital investment
decisions of couples entering Australia under diﬀerent visa categories are assessed. Information
about principle applicant/accompanying spouse status is used to sort out whether the observed
relationships are driven by comparative labor market advantage or by gender roles. While some
decisions appear consistent with comparative advantage and the family investment hypothesis
(e.g., participation), others appear to stem from traditional gender roles (e.g., investment in
education).
21M o t i v a t i o n
Immigration has played a major role in shaping the identity of several industrialized countries.
The tremendous growth of the United States and Canada in the 19th Century was fueled to a
large degree by migrants, while Australia began to actively recruit immigrants after WWII to
ensure an adequate supply of labor for a growing economy. Given this, it is not surprising that
studies of how immigrants adapt to and inﬂuence labor market opportunities in the receiving
country have become increasingly common among labor economists.
The majority of early studies concentrated exclusively on the behavior of male immigrants
with researchers only recently turning to focus explicitly on the experiences of female immi-
grants. Even more recently, studies have begun to recognize that migration is not usually a
solitary undertaking but that ”migrating units” often include a husband, wife, and children.
Furthermore, the family itself may have an important role in the process of immigrant settle-
ment. In particular, researchers have hypothesized that due to an inability to borrow against
future earnings to ﬁnance current consumption, immigrant households adopt a family invest-
ment strategy (Long, 1980; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Duleep and Sanders 1993; Worswick,
1996; and Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Speciﬁcally, immigrant wives undertake labor mar-
ket activities that facilitate their husbands’ investments in receiving country-speciﬁch u m a n
capital.
Researchers attempting to evaluate the family investment hypothesis have struggled with
important data limitations. In particular, labor force surveys and censuses may identify the
foreign born, but typically provide no information about the migrating unit or the immigration
3process itself. Principal applicants are usually indistinguishable from accompanying family
members and while family units at the time of data collection are identiﬁed, family units at
the time of migration are completely unknown. Still, many researchers have concluded that
the family investment hypothesis is consistent with the observed labor market behavior of
immigrant men and women in ways that other explanations are not.1
Our goal is to re-examine the family investment hypothesis taking advantage of a new data
source that provides panel data for a recent cohort of immigrant households. The Longitudinal
Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously
consider the labor-supply behavior of men and women in the same migrating household. In
particular we are interested in addressing the following questions: ﬁrst, how does the settlement
process vary across households entering Australia under diﬀerent selection criteria and second,
do these patterns appear to support the family investment hypothesis? The answers to these
questions have important policy implications because immigration policy is, after all, typically
results in the selection of households rather than individuals.2 Given this, it is vital for
immigration research to move beyond a simple analysis of individuals to consider the entire
immigrant household. We also hope to add to the growing body of literature that focuses on
the contribution of immigrant wives to the economic status of their families as well as the role
of the family in labor market behavior of immigrant women.
In the following section of the paper, the existing literature on the family investment
1In particular, Baker and Benjamin (1997) explicitly consider alternative explanations for the observed
relationships in immigrant men and women’s hours and wages over time. See also Beach and Worswick, 1993.
2Once an individual principal applicant applies for and is granted a visa, dependent family members are
automatically granted visas as well.
4hypothesis and the labor market experience of immigrant women is reviewed. An overview
of the LSIA data is presented in Section III. A discussion of the estimation procedure and
empirical results follow. The ﬁnal section of the paper discusses some general conclusions and
provides suggestions for future research.
2 The Family Investment Hypothesis
Numerous studies have detailed the labor-market experiences of immigrants in the United
States, in Canada, and in Australia.3 The majority of early studies, however, concentrated
exclusively on male immigrants and focused on the relationship between relative immigrant-
native earnings on the one hand and the eﬀects of year of arrival (cohort eﬀects) and the number
of years since migration (typically called assimilation) on the other.4 Male immigrants were
estimated to have lower earnings immediately after arrival, but have relatively high earnings
growth over time.5 These patterns were thought to be explained by the diﬃculties in completely
transferring human capital across countries and the resulting need to accumulate host country-
speciﬁc human capital (Chiswick, 1978).
Recognizing that immigrant women often make substantial contributions to family earnings,
researchers then turned an assessment of the labor market behavior of immigrant women-
particularly married immigrant women-over time (Chiswick, 1980; Long, 1980; MacPherson
and Stewart. 1989; Beach and Worswick, 1993; Duleep and Sanders 1993; Worswick, 1996;
3See Wooden, et al (1994) for a recent review of the Australian literature.
4A more limited number of studies have focused on participation or unemployment (cites???).
5See Boras (1985) and LaLonde and Topel (1992) for a discussion of the methodological issues involved in
estimating the magnitude of the assimilation eﬀect.
5and Schoeni 1998).6 Long (1980) was the ﬁrst to demonstrate that although immigrant women
often have higher earnings than native-born women immediately after migration, as the number
of years since migration increased relative immigrant-native earnings declined. These patterns-
which were directly opposed to those observed for immigrant men-lead Long to speculate that
immigrant wives were working to ﬁnance their husbands’ investment in U.S.-speciﬁch u m a n
capital.
This family investment hypothesis (as it has come to be called) postulates that due to
credit constraints, immigrant families who need to make investments in host country-speciﬁc
human capital must ﬁnance that investment themselves. As a result, immigrant wives (gener-
ally secondary workers) undertake those labor market activities that facilitate their husbands’
investments in receiving country-speciﬁc human capital. The family investment hypothesis
predicts that immigrant wives are more likely to work, work longer hours, and forego their
own investment in human capital by taking better paying but dead-end jobs.
Empirical tests of the family investment hypothesis have produced somewhat mixed results.
Duleep and Sanders (1993) ﬁnd that-as predicted-labor force participation rates are higher for
immigrant women whose husbands have diﬃculty adapting to the new labor market and need to
make investments in host-country skills. Baker and Benjamin (1997) ﬁnd that women married
to foreign-born men work more upon arrival, have ﬂatter wage proﬁles, and have a lower
6In addition to the standard factors typically inﬂuencing the labor force participation decisions of native-
born women, country of origin is also thought to aﬀect the labor-supply decisions of married immigrant women
through diﬀerences in skill transferability (Chiswick, 1980; Duleep and Sanders, 1993) or cultural attitudes
(Reimers, 1985). The presence of other adult relatives in the home is positively related to the propensity that
immigrant women work (MacPherson and Stewart, 1989; Duleep and Sanders, 1993), while women married
before migration have lower participation rates than women married after migration (MacPherson and Stewart
1989). Finally, a limited number of recent studies have assessed the extent to which the employment behavior
of immigrant women changes through the assimilation process (Funkhauser and Trejo, 1997; Schoeni, 1998).
6propensity to invest in schooling relative to immigrant women married to native-born men.
After ruling out conventional price explanations, they conclude these patterns lend support for
the idea of a family investment strategy.
At the same time, MacPherson and Stewart (1989), ﬁnd only weak support the notion
that immigrant women to the United States increase their labor force participation when their
husbands attend school.7 Consistent with the family investment model, Worswick (1996) ﬁnds
that relative to native-born women, immigrant women in Canada have higher wages, lower
returns to education, and are less sensitive to the eﬀect of young children. On the other hand,
he ﬁnds that the relative wage growth of immigrant women exceeds the relative wage growth
of immigrant men suggesting that it is immigrant women rather than immigrant men who are
investing in human capital.8
Additionally, the empirical literature produces two puzzles concerning the family invest-
ment hypothesis that are as yet unresolved. First, if the labor supply and human capital in-
vestment behavior of immigrant families is driven by credit constraints, we should observe very
recent immigrant families acting consistently with the family investment hypothesis. Credit
constraints are almost certainly more binding immediately after migration (Worswick, 1999).
Yet there is evidence that while the family investment hypothesis holds for more established
immigrants, it does not describe the behavior of very recent immigrants (Worswick, 1996;
Baker and Benjamin, 1997).9 Second, household decisions about which partner undertakes
7Signiﬁcant eﬀects were found only for immigrant women from Canada and the West Indies.
8Beach and Worswick (1993) using a single cross-section of data assess the relative earnings of immigrant
women in Canada and conclude that although immigrant women have higher earnings than native-born wormen
they also have a ﬂat earnings proﬁle.
9Note Baker and Benjamin (1997) ﬁnd that the sum of the estimated cohort eﬀects for immigrant husbands
and wives are negative for the most recent cohort of immigrants (See Table 2). Similarly, Worswick ﬁnds that
7the human capital investment and which partner undertakes the borrowing function theoret-
ically depend upon each partner’s comparative advantage. Yet, even after identifying mixed
immigrant/native-born families in which the comparative advantage is presumably clearer,
Baker and Benjamin (1997) provide evidence that the family investment hypothesis does not
appear to hold symmetrically for immigrant men and women.10
3M o d e l
The model of family labor supply used in the analysis of this paper is based in part on the stan-
dard dynamic labor supply model (see for example Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980, MaCurdy,
1981, MaCurdy, 1983, Browning, Deaton and Irish, 1985). Much of the previous literature
assumes perfect capital markets. Following Ball (1990) and Worswick (1999), the assumption
of no credit constraints in the dynamic labor supply model is relaxed in the same way as in
the dynamic consumption literature (see Zeldes, 1989, and Runkle, 1991). The model also
allows for multiple time uses. In particular, each person in the household can devote time to:
1) leisure (including home production), 2) wage labor, 3) investment activities (which could
include formal education or job search).
The household is assumed to choose household consumption, hours in paid work, hours in
investment activities of both the head and spouse in the household. The household’s utility is
immigrant women do not supply more hours than native-born women in the ﬁrst few years after migration.
10In particular, immigrant men married to native-born women appear to have the same wage-age proﬁles as
native-born men married to native-born women suggesting that they bypass the traditional investment process
of other immigrant families.















The within period utility function has the following general form: U(τ)=U(C(τ),l 1(τ),l 2(τ))
where C(τ) is family consumption, la(τ) ≡ T− haw(τ)−hae(τ) is the hours of leisure of adult
a =1 ,2, T is the total number of hours in the period, haw(τ) is the hours of paid work of
person a in period τ,a n d hae(τ) is the hours in investment activities of person a in period τ,
for a =1 ,2, and τ =1 ,...,T. Finally, ρ i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . 11
Hourly wage rates are determined in part by the stock of human capital of the person. A
person can accumulate human capital by: 1) spending time in wage employment or 2) devoting
time to investment activities. In each case, the time spent adds to his/her stock of human
capital, ka(τ). Each person’s level of human capital can be expressed as:
ka(τ)=( 1− δ)ka(τ − 1) + fw(haw(τ)) + fe(hae(τ)) (2)
where ka(τ) is the human capital of spouse a in period τ, fj(haj(τ)) is the increase in person
a’s human capital due to the time spent in activity j in period τ, δ i st h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n
of human capital for a =1 ,2, τ =1 ,...,T, j = e,w.I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tf0
j() > 0a n df00
j () ≤ 0
for j = e,w.
A person can be unemployed in the model if the person receives a wage oﬀer in a period
that is below the minimum wage, wmin(τ). It is assumed that the wage a person is oﬀered in
11An extension of the utility function for the family would be to allow for diﬀerent dis-utilities to time spent
in the diﬀerent time use activities. In the present form of the utility function, the direct utility cost of an extra
hour spent in each of the alternative activities is the marginal utility from leisure.
9each period is deterministic and a function of their human capital. Therefore, a person with
human capital ka(τ) will receive a wage oﬀer of wa(τ)=w(ka(τ)) in period τ.12
The household chooses consumption, hours of paid work for each adult and hours in invest-
ment activities for each adult so as to maximize household utility subject to a set of constraints.
The asset accumulation constraint has the following form:
A(τ) − A(τ − 1)(1 + r(τ)) =
2 X
a=1




where wa(τ) is the wage paid to adult a in the labor market in period τ for τ =0 ,...,T;
j =1 ,...,J. A(τ) is non-human wealth held at the end of period τ;a n dr(τ)i st h ei n t e r e s t
rate in period τ, p(τ) is the price of the composite commodity, and pe(τ)i ss c h o o lt u i t i o np e r
hour, for τ =0 ,...,T.
We will allow for the possibility that the household may be credit-constrained. If the
household faces a credit constraint it will be represented by a non-negativity constraint on
A(τ):
A(τ) ≥ 0( 4 )
The household can sell oﬀ assets which it holds at the beginning of the period, A(τ)(1+r(τ+1)),
b u ti tc a n n o ta l l o wi t se n do fp e r i o da s s e t s ,A(τ), to drop below zero.
The following non-negativity constraints are imposed on hours of work, hours in investment
activities for each person, a, are restricted to be non-negative in period τ:
haw(τ) ≥ 0( 5 )
12We do not model the possibility of job search in the theoretical model. Investment activities could be thought
o fa sj o bs e a r c hi nt h ec o n t e x to ft h em o d e l . J o bs e a r c hb e h a v i o u ri sa n a l y z e ds e p a r a t e l yf r o mi n v e s t m e n to f
time in formal education in the empirical model.
10hae(τ) ≥ 0( 6 )
for a =1 ,2, τ =0 ,...,T.
The household’s problem is to maximize (1) subject to constraints (3) through to (2) and
initial and terminal conditions on assets, A0 and AT.
Assuming an interior solution for C(τ), the necessary conditions are:
Uc(τ) − λ(τ)p(τ)=0 ( 7 )
(1 − du(τ)){−Ula(τ)+ψ(τ)f0
w(τ)+λ(τ)wa(τ)+δwa(τ)} =0 ( 8 )
−Ula(τ)+ψ(τ)f0
e(τ) − λ(τ)pe(τ)+δea(τ)=0 ( 9 )
where Ux(τ)i st h ed e r i v a t i v eo fU(τ)w i t hr e s p e c tt ox.T h ep a r a m e t e rλ(τ) is the multiplier
for the period τ asset accumulation constraint; ψ(t) is the multiplier on the human capital
accumulation equation (2); δwa(τ) is the multiplier on the period τ non-negativity constraint
for the hours in income-generating activity of adult a,( 5 ) ;δea(τ) is the multiplier on the non-
negativity constraint for the hours in investment activities of person a in period τ,( 6 ) .T h e
dummy variable du(τ) equals one if the person is unemployed which is the case if wa(t) <
wmin(t).
For example, if adult a works a positive number of hours for wages then −Ula(τ)=
−λ(τ)wa(τ), otherwise, −Ula(τ) < −λ(τ)wa(τ), which means that the increase in utility which
the household receives from the wage does not compensate for the disutility from the adult
working the ﬁrst hour.




Et{λ(t +1 ) ( 1+r(t +1 ) )} + γ(t)( 1 0 )
If the household is credit-constrained in period t, γ(t) > 0, otherwise γ(t) = 0. In order to
interpret this condition, assume for the moment that the household is not credit-constrained in
period t,w h i c hi m p l i e sγ(t) = 0. In this case, the condition equates the expected present value
of the increase in utility from another unit of wealth in period t+1,(1+ρ)−1Et{λ(t+1)(1+
r(t +1 ) ) }, to the cost in terms of the decrease in utility in period t, λ(t). If the household is
credit-constrained in period t, the household would like to lower its end of period assets, A(t),
below zero by borrowing against future earnings.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
The econometric model is derived from the ﬁrst order conditions (8) and (9). Our approach is
to estimate reduced-form models that allow us to compare the behavior of diﬀerent immigrant
households at time of arrival in Australia and with year-since-migration. A comparison of
immigrant families according to their admission criteria (identiﬁed by their visa categories) will
be made in order to investigate whether certain groups of immigrant families are more likely to
ﬁt the family investment hypothesis. In particular, we are interested in identifying immigrant
families from diﬀerent admissions criteria that are more likely to: 1) make investment decisions
after arrival and 2) have diﬃculty accessing credit to ﬁnance those investments. Next, we will
investigate which adult household member receives the beneﬁts of the investment in the form
of human capital formation and which household member bears the cost of ﬁnancing these
investments in the form of extra labor supply and reduced human capital investment activities.
12Our focus initially is on the determinants of whether the secondary earner enters the labor
market or not, and whether he or she is employed or unemployed and how many hours the
secondary earner works if employed. These outcomes can be modelled oﬀ of equations (8) and
(9).
Using (8), it is possible to deﬁne the following reduced form expression for the case of adult
a choosing to enter the labor market:
Xap(t)βp + εap(t) ≡− Ula(t,la(t)=T)+ψ(t)f0
w(t)+λ(t)wa(t) > 0( 1 1 )
Conditional on being in the labor market, the following reduced form expression can be
deﬁn e df o rt h ec a s eo fa d u l ta being unemployed:
Xau(t)βu + εau(t) ≡ wa(t) − wmin(t) < 0( 1 2 )
Using (9), the following reduced form expression can be deﬁn e df o rt h ec a s eo fa d u l ta
choosing to participate in investment activities:
Xae(t)βe + εau(t) ≡− Ula(t,la(t)=T)+ψ(t)f0
e(t) − λ(t)pe(t) > 0( 1 3 )
Ideally, the analysis should take into account the joint nature of these decisions. However,
given the complexity involved in estimating multinomial choice problems where heterogeneity
in preferences over the diﬀerent choices are likely to be correlated, we adopt a strategy of
estimating simple reduced-form equations by probit and tobit methods.
135 Data and Estimation Sample
At least three important data limitations may have played a role in limiting researchers’ ability
to reach ﬁrm conclusions regarding the family investment hypothesis. First, labor force surveys
and censuses identify the foreign born, but typically do not distinguish principal applicants
from accompanying family members or skilled immigrants from family immigrants and refugees.
As a result, it has been diﬃcult for researchers to isolate those immigrants for whom the
family investment hypothesis is most likely to apply.13 Additionally, while family units at the
time of data collection are identiﬁed in some surveys, family units at the time of migration
are completely unknown. Researchers often do not know which individuals were married at
the time of migration let alone whether they were married to their current spouse. Because
this is likely to be a smaller problem for recent rather than established immigrants, there
exists the possibility that household formation plays a role in generating observed earnings-age
proﬁles. Finally, the use of cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data leads to well-known
methodological problems in identifying earnings assimilation (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985;
LaLonde and Topel, 1992).
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) provides a unique opportunity
to re-examine the role of the family in immigrants’ early labor market experience. The LSIA
collected a considerable amount of demographic, human capital, and labor market information
for a cohort of principal applicants and their spouses.14 Spanning the ﬁrst three and a half
13Baker and Benjamin (1997) separately consider native, immigrant and mixed families, while Duleep and
Sanders (1993) focus on potential country-of-origin diﬀerences in the need for investment.
14Technical details can be found in Appendix 2 of Williams, et al. (1997) and the User Documentation
for the data set. Along with interviewing principal applicants, complete information was also collected for
migrating-unit spouses and limited information was collected for other members of the household.
14years of the settlement process, the three waves of data provide the opportunity to follow a
cohort of recent immigrants to Australia as they enter the labor market and begin looking for
work.
The LSIA sample generalizes to principal applicants aged 15 and older who arrived in
Australia between September 1993 and August 1995. A total of 5192 principal applicants in
this migration cohort were interviewed starting in March of 1994 approximately ﬁve to six
months after their arrival. Starting in March of 1995 (approximately 18 months after arrival),
4469 members of the original sample were re-interviewed. Finally, 3752 of these principle
applicants were re-interviewed for a third time approximately three and a half years after
migration. Our estimation sample consists of the 1769 Wave 1, 1530 Wave 2, and 1302 Wave
3 principal applicants with spouses who were also interviewed.15
Researchers attempting to empirically evaluate the family investment model have generally
adopted one of three approaches. One approach has been to compare the employment behavior
and earnings of immigrant and native-born men and women (Long, 1980; Beach and Worswick,
1993; Worswick, 1996, Worswick, 1999). A second approach has been to compare the labor
market outcomes of those immigrant families believed to require human capital investments
with immigrant families that do not (Duleep and Sanders, 1993; Baker and Benjamin, 1997).
Finally, a third approach has been to incorporate measures of an immigrant husband’s human
capital investment behavior directly into the analysis of immigrant wives’ labor supply behavior
(MacPherson and Stewart, 1989).
15In Wave 1, 1837 principal applicants had migrating unit spouses eligible for interviews. Of these spouses
96.3 percent (or 1769) were actually interviewed. In Wave 2, there were 1530 principle applicants with spouses
eligible for interviews and of these 95.4 percent (1530) were interviewed.
15As the LSIA data do not contain information about native-born workers we will adopt
the second approach and plan to pursue the third in a future version of this paper. We
will use information about an immigrant family’s visa category and region-of-origin to make
inferences about the potential need to invest in Australia-speciﬁc human capital. As Baker
and Benjamin (1997) note, ”variation across families provides a natural forum in which to
investigate the family investment mode.” We also assess direct information about a household’s
human capital investment activity - in particular enrollment in formal education While it will
not be possible to make statements about how immigrant status in and of itself matters, our
panel data for immigrant households allows us for the ﬁrst time to directly test the family
investment hypothesis.16
Non-humanitarian immigration to Australia is separated into two components: one based
strictly on family relationships (Preferential Family) and the other based on potential labor
market contributions. As migrants in the Preferential Family category are often migrating as
individuals to reunite with family members (often future spouses) already resident in Australia,
we are not able to include them in this analysis of migrating households.17 Skill-based migration
includes migrants without family relationships who are points tested (Independents), migrants
with pre-arranged oﬀers of employment (Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS)), and migrants
intending to establish businesses in Australia who meet certain capital requirements (Business
Skills). The Concessional Family program assesses individuals on the basis of both their
16See Beach and Worswick (1993) for a discussion of the importance of linked husband/wife panel data in
directly testing the family investment hypothesis.
17Unfortunately, our data do not provide information about family members who are not part of the migrating
unit and so Preferential Family migrants joinging family members already in Australia cannot be analyzed.
While we did have a very small sample of Preferential Family migrants migrating as couples, they are not
representative of the category as a whole and have thus been dropped from the analysis.
16family connections and their skills. Finally, a number of immigrants are selected for entry
into Australia on the basis of humanitarian concerns.18 Individuals in certain visa categories
are less likely to require additional human capital investments after migration. ENS migrants,
for example, are granted visas because their speciﬁc skills allow Australian employers to ﬁll a
particular skill gap. Humanitarian migrants, on the other hand, often have very limited skills.
Table 1 includes sample means for key variables broken down by the gender of the principal
applicant and spouse and by the visa category of the principal applicant. Column (1) and (2)
give the mean behavior of female spouses and male principal applicants by visa category while
columns (3) and (4) give the mean behavior of male spouses and female principal applicants
by visa category. Our interest in making this breakdown is to observe whether diﬀerences
between principal applicant behavior and spouse behavior are the same for households where
the husband is the principal applicant versus households where the woman is the principal
applicant.
Male principal applicants have the highest participation rates of the four types of spouses
within each visa category. Participation is generally higher in ENS households for a given type
of spouse and generally lowest in Humanitarian couples. In households where the husband
is the principal applicant, the mean participation rate for the husband is much higher than
the participation rate for the wife. In households where the wife is the principal applicant,
the male spouse has a higher participation rate than the wife; however, the diﬀerence is much
smaller than in households where the husband is the principal applicant.
18Information about visa status comes from Department of Immigration and Multicultural Aﬀairs adminis-
trative records not self-reports.
17Unemployment rates are very low in ENS households, particularly for the principal appli-
cant and are highest in humanitarian households. This is consistent with the notion that the
ENS applicant is likely to have pre-arranged employment; however, it also implies that spouses
of ENS applicants are at an advantage in terms of ﬁnding work compared with spouses of
principal applicants under diﬀerent visa categories.
Hours of work are generally similar across visa categories for spouses of a particular type.
Male principal applicants under the ENS category have the highest mean hours of work at 47
hours and female spouses under the humanitarian category have the lowest hours at 31 hours.
In terms of human capital investment behavior, school enrolment rates are generally highest
in the concessional family and independent visa category households; however, the patterns
across principal applicants versus spouses by visa category are unclear. The job search behavior
for the employed is also unclear. It appears that husbands in concessional family households
have high rates of search for new jobs.
.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Labor Market Participation
We begin by assessing how the determinants of labor force participation, unemployment, hours
of work, and human capital investment vary across immigrant couples entering Australia under
diﬀerent visa categories. Given the selection criteria associated with diﬀerent types of visas,
we would expect that Humanitarian migrants are the most and ENS migrants the least likely
18to require Australia-speciﬁc human capital investment. Additionally, we would expect the la-
bor market behavior of principle applicants to diﬀer from that of accompanying spouses. All
principle applicants (with the exception of Humanitarian migrants) are selected to varying de-
grees for their labor market skills while no selection criteria are applied to spouses. Given this,
within a couple we would expect the behavior of principle applicants to more closely mirror the
behavior of primary earners, while spouses can more easily be thought of as secondary earners.
Previous researchers have not had the ability to separately identify principle applicants and
spouses. Instead, immigrant husbands have been assumed to be primary workers undertak-
ing investment activities, while immigrant wives have been assumed to be secondary workers
undertaking ﬁnancing activities (Baker and Benjamin, 1994, 1997; Duleep and Sanders, 1993;
Worswick, 1996). Knowing which member of the couple is the principle applicant provides us
with an opportunity to test whether individuals’ investment/borrowing behavior is consistent
with their comparative advantage.19
Individuals are assumed to participate in the labor market whenever the returns to market
work exceed the value of their time in alternative activities. Speciﬁcally, the probability of
immigrant adult a from household i participating in the Australian labor market at time t is
assumed to be given by:
Pr(Pia(t)=1| Xap(t)) = Φ(Xap(t)βp)( 1 4 )
where a indexes the adult, Pia(t) = 1 for labor market participants and 0 otherwise, Φ(Xap(t)βp)
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and βp is a vector of parameters to
19This is least likely to hold for couples in the Humanitarian category as there is no clear relationship between
principle applicant status and labor market behavior. Baker and Benjamin (1997) attempt to get at this issue
of comparative labor market advantage by considering ‘mixed’ immigrant/native couples.
19be estimated. Finally, Xap(t) is a vector of each partner’s human capital (education, English
ability, and years since migration), demographic (age) and geographic (gender-speciﬁc, state-
speciﬁc resident unemployment rates and state of residence) variables believed to be related to
market wages and the value of time in non-market activities. Although the data do not provide
a direct measure of labor market experience, pre-migration occupation and employment status
are included in the model to act as controls for the eﬀects of prior experience.
Equation (14) was estimated separately for male and female principal applicants and
spouses using a pooled probit model and the unbalanced sample.2021 Table 2 reports the
marginal eﬀects-i.e., the change in the probability of participation associated with a change in
each independent variable-from this regression.22
Both partners in ”traditional” couples (female spouses/male principle applicants) have
increasing labor market participation rates over time, but there is no signiﬁcant relationship
between the probability of labor market participation and the time since migration for men
and women in ”non-traditional” couples (female principle applicants/male spouses). In general,
individuals in diﬀerent visa categories do not have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent participation proﬁles
suggesting that there is little diﬀerence in the speed of labor market entry for individuals in
20All estimation was done in STATA 6.0.
21We also considered a speciﬁcation of equation (14) which would allow for the presence of unobserved individ-
ual eﬀects that in turn produce correlation among the error terms. We chose, however, not to estimate random
eﬀects probit models because this model is limited by the assumption that there is no correlation between any
of the explanatory variables and the individual eﬀects themselves. Conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logit models would
not require this assumption, but would also not allow us to calculate marginal eﬀects. Because the standard
pooled probit does not require the assumption of independence and produces consistent-though ineﬃcient results
(Maddala, 1987)-we have chosen to report the results from the standard pooled probit regressions.
22Note that for continuous variables such as age, the marginal eﬀect represents the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal
change in the independent variable on the probability that an immigrant was in a speciﬁc labor market state.
For discrete variables, such as marital status, the marginal eﬀect represents the eﬀect of a one-unit change in
the independent variable. See the STATA manual for more details.
20diﬀerent visa categories.23 In contrast, the family investment hypothesis predicts that spouses
whose partners are investing in human capital enter the labor market faster in order to ﬁnance
that investment. Unfortunately, our relatively short time frame (the ﬁrst 3 1/2 years after
migration) does not provide us with a strong test of this particular prediction.
Diﬀerences in the probability of labor market participation across visa categories are gen-
erally consistent with the family investment hypothesis, however. Spouses of Independent
migrants (who are selected exclusively on labor market skills) have signiﬁcantly higher par-
ticipation rates than spouses of ENS migrants (who have employment in Australia prior to
migration). This corresponds with a somewhat lower participation rate for Independent prin-
ciple applicants. Spouses of Concessional Family migrants (who are selected in part on labor
market skills) have even higher participation rates, while spouses of Humanitarian migrants
(who are not selected at all on labor market skills) have somewhat higher participation rates
although not as high as those for spouses in the Concessional Family category.
Estimating the participation model separately by principle applicant/spouse status in ad-
dition to the more standard husband/wife status provides additional support for the family
investment hypothesis. In general, the participation decision of female spouses closely resemble
that of male spouses, but appears very diﬀerent to that of female principle applicants. Spouses
(whether male or female) in all visa categories have higher labor market participation rates
than spouses in ENS couples.24 In contrast, principle applicants (whether male or female) have
lower participation rates in all categories than ENS migrants, although the result is signiﬁcant
23The exception is that male Independent principle applicants have signiﬁcantly slower labor market entry
t h a nd om e ni nt h eE N Sc a t e g o r y .
24This result is not signiﬁcant for male spouses in Independent and Humanitarian couples, however.
21in only half the cases. These relationships suggest that individuals’ behavior is consistent with
their comparative advantage in investing and borrowing activities rather than with traditional
gender roles. Wives who are principle applicants appear to be investing, while husbands who
are spouses appear to be ﬁnancing that investment.
6.2 Unemployment and Hours of Work
A probit model was used to estimate the determinants of unemployment for male and fe-
male principle applicants and spouses conditional on labor market participation.25 Selected
marginal eﬀects from this regression are reported in Table 3. Not surprisingly, amongst labor
market participants, unemployment rates decrease with time since migration. This almost
certainly occurs as a result of the increased human capital and labor market information that
migrants acquire with time in Australia. What is more interesting is the signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the rates of employment assimilation for migrants in diﬀerent visa categories. Although the
unemployment rates of men and women in traditional couples holding Concessional Family,
Independent, and Humanitarian visas are signiﬁcantly higher than those of ENS migrants,
over time their unemployment rates fall much faster than does the rate for ENS migrants.
This is important because it implies that although ENS migrants initially have a head start
in securing employment, they may not have permanently lower unemployment rates. It is less
clear that there is convergence in unemployment rates across visa groups for men and women
in non-traditional couples, though the magnitudes of the diﬀerences is also smaller.
In much of the family investment hypothesis literature, unemployment is thought to be
25As before, the pooled, unbalanced sample was used.
22the result of job search and as such represents a form of human capital investment (Baker
and Benjamin, 1997; Worswick, 1996). Because immigrant families are likely to be credit
constrained, secondary workers-typically wives-take on those labor market activities that help
to ﬁnance their spouses’ continued job search. This notion of unemployment may not be
unreasonable in a ﬂexible labor market such as the United States and Canada, but it is less
likely to be appropriate in Australia, however, where labor relations are heavily regulated by
a complex system of binding minimum wages.26 In Australia, it is employment (rather than
wage rates) which is the mechanism for labor market adjustment. As such, unemployment rates
for Australian immigrants are likely to tell us more about the overall immigrant assimilation
process than about the ways in which immigrant couples deal with credit constraints.
OLS estimates of the determinants of weekly hours of work are presented in Table 4 for those
individuals with positive hours.27 Given that one has found employment, there is evidence of
increasing weekly hours of work for over time for men and women in traditional immigrant
families, though there is little evidence that either the level of hours or the change in hours
over time varies across individuals holding diﬀerent visas. Only principle applicants holding
Humanitarian visas have signiﬁcantly lower weekly hours relative to ENS principle applicants
and except for Independent principle applicants who have a somewhat ﬂatter hours proﬁle, the
26Under the Australian Award system, minimum terms and conditions of employment are speciﬁed for most
job classiﬁcations, in eﬀect providing a series of minimum wage rates. While the centralized wage determination
system provided by the Prices and Incomes Accord was abolished in 1996 and replaced by a system of enterprise
bargaining, the Awards continue to provide minimum wages and conditions that enterprise bargains must meet.
27In the results presented here, we have made no attempt to correct for the selectivity into employment
although this will be the focus of future work. We did estimate tobit models of hours, but found that the
Tobit speciﬁcation was not ﬂexible enough in dealing with participation and employment. Our plan is to
estimate a more general selection model that allows for selection into either, non-participation, unemployment
or employment and use this model to adjust for the selectivity into employment when analyzing the hours of
married spouses.
23rate of increase in average hours is constant across visa categories.
In non-traditional families, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent. Female principle applicants
entering Australia through pre-arranged employment or as a result of the ability and desire
to establish a new business work signiﬁcantly more hours per week than women holding other
types of visas and this relationship is stable over time. There is no signiﬁcant relationship
between visa category or time since migration and the weekly hours of work of male spouses.
Taken together, these results imply that in Australia it is entry employment itself-rather than
wage or hours assimilation-that is the important dimension of the settlement process for im-
migrants.
6.3 Human Capital Investment
In the face of the diﬃculties involved in completely transferring human capital across countries,
immigrants often ﬁnd it necessary to make investments in host country-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l .
The extent of this additional human capital investment will vary in proportion to the amount
(and transferability) of the skills and training that immigrants possess at the time they migrate.
In this section we focus speciﬁcally on the human capital investments of recent immigrants
to Australia. We will consider two measures of human capital investment—formal education
and job search—and we will focus speciﬁc a l l yo nb o t ht h et i m i n ga n dl e v e lo fh u m a nc a p i t a l
investment. Information about the selection criteria embodied in diﬀerent migration programs
is used to identify those immigrants most likely to require additional human capital investment.
Using the pooled unbalanced sample, a probit model was used to estimate the determinants
24of school enrolment and job search conditional upon employment. Selected marginal eﬀects
from these regressions are reported in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.
The school enrollment rates of Australian immigrants increase over the ﬁrst few years after
migration, and then begin to decline. This pattern is remarkably similar across male and
female principle applicants and spouses, although male principle applicants-particularly male
ENS principle applicants-enroll in formal education somewhat faster than other groups.
Not surprisingly, amongst male principle applicants, ENS migrants are least likely to be
enrolled in school. These migrants, after all, have jobs-either through Australian ﬁrms or
through self-employment-lined up prior to actual migration. What is surprising is the high
proportion of Independent migrants who are enrolled in education. Male principle applicants
selected entirely on the basis of their labor market skills (Independents) have school enrollment
rates that are signiﬁcantly higher than otherwise similar migrants who were selected only in
part (Concessional Family) or not at all (Humanitarian) for their skills. In contrast, there are
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in either the level or speed of school enrollment of female spouses in
diﬀerent visa categories.
Though there are no signiﬁcant diﬀe r e n c e si nh o wq u i c k l ym e na n dw o m e ni n” n o n -
traditional” immigrant families enroll in Australian schooling, male spouses holding Indepen-
dent and Humanitarian visas are signiﬁcantly more likely than otherwise men married to ENS
migrants to be enrolled in formal education. Correspondingly, female ENS principle applicants
are less likely to be enrolled in school though the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.
Taken together these results imply that while school enrollment rates are lower among
25ENS migrants as we might expect, school enrollment rates are surprisingly high among other
skilled migrant groups. Furthermore, these overall patterns do not provide clear evidence
that it is comparative advantage in the labor market that is driving the decision to invest
in additional education. Male principle applicants look more like male spouses than female
principle applicants raising the possibility that gender role within couples are playing a role in
the decision to enroll in school.
Table 6 provides evidence on an alternative form of human capital investment-job search.
B e c a u s eo fo u rc o n c e r nt h a tt h ej o bs e a r c ho ft h eu n e m p l o y e dm a yb ed r i v e nm o r eb yA u s t r a l i a n
institutional arrangements and demand-side factors, rather than voluntary job search, we have
limited our analysis to individuals already employed. Job search while employed appears
to be an important form of human capital investment for Australian immigrants. Principle
applicants (both male and female) holding Humanitarian visas are signiﬁcantly more likely
than ENS migrants to be searching for new work. This is consistent with our view that
Humanitarian migrants have the lowest level of Australia-speciﬁc human capital. Concessional
Family principle applicants who were selected in part for their skills are somewhat less likely
to be searching for new employment, while Independents selected entirely on the basis of their
skill are even less likely to be undertaking job search. Finally, ENS migrants who arrive in
Australia with pre-arranged employment are the least likely to be engaged in job search.
Unlike the case of formal education, job search while employed appears more consistent
with our views about comparative advantage. First, although visa category is unrelated to the
job search of employed spouses, there are important diﬀerences in the search behavior of both
26male and female principle applicants in diﬀerent visa categories. Second, these diﬀerences are
consistent with our views about individuals’ existing human capital. Overall, it appears that
job search is related to comparative advantage in labor market activities rather than gender.
6.4 Conclusions
Migration is usually not a solitary undertaking, but often involves the movement of entire
families including husbands, wives, and children and there are many reasons to believe that
the family itself may play an important part in facilitating settlement. In particular, researchers
hae hypothesized that in the face of credit constraints, immigrant wives may undertake certain
labor market activities in order to ﬁnance their husbands investments in receiving country-
speciﬁc human capital. Evaluating this family investment hypothesis, however, has proved
diﬃcult, because standard data sources often identify the foreign born, but typically provide
no information about the migrating unit or the immigration process itself. Principal applicants
are usually indistinguishable from accompanying family members and while family units at
the time of data collection are identiﬁed, family units at the time of migration are completely
unknown.
This paper re-examines the family investment hypothesis by taking advantage of new panel
data for a recent cohort of immigrant households. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to
Australia provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously consider the labor-supply and hu-
man capital investment decisions of men and women in the same migrating household. We
began by assessing how the determinants of participation, unemployment, hours, and human
capital investment vary across couples entering Australia under diﬀerent visa categories. Prin-
27ciple applicant/accompanying spouse status was used to untangle the eﬀects of comparative
labor market advantage from traditional by gender roles. While some decisions appear consis-
tent with comparative advantage and the family investment hypothesis (e.g., participation),
others appear to stem from traditional gender roles (e.g., investment in education). Work is
currently underway to explore the interrelationships between the investment behavior of prin-
ciple applicants and the labor supply of their spouses. In addition, asset information will also
be used to focus more directly on those families most likely to be credit constrained.
This focus on immigrant families ﬁlls an important void in the literature. Immigration
policy in the major immigrant receiving nations is typically results in the selection of families
rather than individuals, yet it is individuals rather than families which are the unit of analysis
in much of the immigration literature. Immigration research is also heavily weighted toward
asssessing the behavior of and labor market outcomes for men. This paper adds to the growing
body of literature that focuses on the contribution of immigrant wives to the economic status
of their families as well as the role of the family in labor market behavior of immigrant women.
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32Table 1 
Sample Means of Key Variables 
  
 (1)   











     
ENS  .3252 .9046 .7596  .7982 
Concessional  Family  .4431 .8496 .8167  .6515 
Independent  .4002 .8618 .8146  .6942 
Humanitarian  .2014 .6261 .5753  .2848 
Unemployed (labour 
market participants) 
     
ENS  .1045 .0189 .1013  0 
Concessional  Family  .2941 .2005 .2398  .2628 
Independent  .2773 .1489 .2575  .2683 
Humanitarian  .5357 .5039 .5640  .4286 
Hours of work per week 
(employed workers) 
     
ENS  30.70 47.41 40.21  40.82 
Concessional  Family  33.51 42.69 39.19  36.19 
Independent  33.77 43.06 42.82  36.91 
Humanitarian  30.92 40.80 38.60  32.46 
Student Status       
ENS  .1347 .0713 .0962  .0826 
Concessional  Family  .1264 .1657 .1625  .1909 
Independent  .2052 .2910 .3317  .2233 
Humanitarian  .0604 .1074 .1070  .0861 
Actively Seeking a new 
job (employed workers) 
     
ENS  .1208 .0891 .2254  .1184 
Concessional  Family  .1944 .2732 .3221  .2000 
Independent  .1860 .2143 .2419  .2556 
Humanitarian  .2769 .3333 .2933  .2564 
 
 Table 2 
Selected Coefficient Estimates from Probit Estimation of Models of  
Married Spouses' Labor Market Participation Decisions 
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Pseudo- R
2 .1860  .1979  .1891  .2571 
LR Chi
2 d.f.=37, p-value  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001 
N 3447  3467  848  858 
Note: 
1. t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
2.  ** significant at the five percent level; * significant at the ten percent level. 
3.  Controls for education, fluency in English, employment prior to migration and age of the 
principal applicant and the spouse are included in each model. Also, controls for state of 
residence, presence of children by age, presence of other adults are included. Table 3 
Selected Coefficient Estimates from Regression Estimation of Models of  
Married Spouses' Hours of Work for Wages  
Over Employed Sample 
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R
2 .0783  .1014  .2064  .2064 
LR Chi
2 d.f.=36, p-value  .0005  less than .0001  less than .0001  .0001 
N 887  2105  419  350 
Note: 
1. t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
2.  ** significant at the five percent level; * significant at the ten percent level. 
3.  Controls for education, fluency in English, employment prior to migration and age of the 
principal applicant and the spouse are included in each model. Also, controls for state of 
residence, presence of children by age, presence of other adults are included. Table 4 
Selected Coefficient Estimates from Probit Estimation of Models of  
Married Spouses' Unemployment Outcomes for Labor Market Participants 
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Pseudo- R
2 .2536  .3715  .2833  .3260 
LR Chi
2 d.f.=37, p-value  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001 
N 1224  2846  614  386 
Note: 
1. t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
2.  ** significant at the five percent level; * significant at the ten percent level. 
3.  Controls for education, fluency in English, employment prior to migration and age of the 
principal applicant and the spouse are included in each model. Also, controls for state of 
residence, presence of children by age, presence of other adults are included. 
4.  There were not female principal applicants in the Business Skills visa category who were 
unemployed; therefore, they were excluded form the analysis of column 4. The mean 
unemployment rates for the other three groups of female principal applicants were .2484, 
.2657 and .4884 for the Concessional Family, Independent and Humanitarian visa 
categories, respectively. Table 5 
Selected Coefficient Estimates from Probit Estimation of Models of  
Married Spouses' School Attendance Decisions 
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Pseudo- R
2 .2241  .1584  .2200  .2075 
LR Chi
2 d.f.=37, p-value  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001  less than .0001 
N 3447  3467  788  858 
Note: 
1. t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
2.  ** significant at the five percent level; * significant at the ten percent level. 
3.  Controls for education, fluency in English, employment prior to migration and age of the 
principal applicant and the spouse are included in each model. Also, controls for state of 
residence, presence of children by age, presence of other adults are included. Table 6 
Selected Coefficient Estimates from Probit Estimation of Models of  
Married Spouses' Job Search while Employed 
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Pseudo- R
2 .0634  .0824  .1178  .1752 
LR Chi
2 d.f.=36, p-value  .0359  less than .0001  .0109  .0039 
N 887  2151  419  354 
Note: 
1. t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
2.  ** significant at the five percent level; * significant at the ten percent level. 
3.  Controls for education, fluency in English, employment prior to migration and age of the 
principal applicant and the spouse are included in each model. Also, controls for state of 
residence, presence of children by age, presence of other adults are included. 
 
 
 